Introduction
Research and debate on the emerging Sino-Zimbabwean relations have mainly focused on the scope and size of China's economic presence but not on how China is perceived by African media and locals in places it is investing in (Banda, 2009 ). The official claims that China's interventions are benefiting Africans are being challenged by local accounts of opposition to China's increased presence. This chapter focuses on how China's soft power is perceived and received in Zimbabwe, a key transitional nation with an official "Look East" policy. By analyzing views of "ordinary" citizens in Harare, Zimbabwe's capital city, on the subject of China's interventions, this research provides a unique account of the emerging Sino-Zimbabwe relationship.
While the official view seems cozy and positive, non-official perspectives tend to be critical of Beijing's actions and policies, seeing them as narrowly benefiting China and Zimbabwean ruling elites. On the one hand, critics of China, as seen from this research, view its intervention as contradictory, unethical, short term, exploitative, and overall as one that places Beijing's economic and political interests over ordinary people's human rights. On the other hand, supporters of China are enthusiastic about beneficial development projects. In discussing the results of the survey of Harare respondents, the research invokes Nyamnjoh's (2012) allegory of the "blind men and an elephant," in which perceptions can be influenced by prior assumptions, lack of familiarity, and prejudices.
Chinese Soft Power and Interventions in Zimbabwe
At Harare International Airport, the "Welcome to Zimbabwe" signs in Chinese are a clear indication that China has been accepted at the official level. By June 2015, an estimated 60
Chinese companies were operating in Zimbabwe, including those in the media and cultural sectors. Muronzi (2014) observes that Zimbabwe's Look East policy is both "politically motivated and a response to economic imperatives in the absence of investment and donor support from the West." The policy was introduced after the launch of the Forum of ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. FOCAC itself is described by Chinese scholars as representing "a new cooperation model between China, the world's largest developing country and Africa, the continent with the highest number of developing countries. Thus, this cooperation model could provide a new basis for solving global poverty" (Li Anshan et al., 2012, p. 9) . It is part of a broader Chinese global strategy that emphasizes "multilateralism" and "South-South coalition" building. On the Zimbabwean side, the policy shift came after the Robert Mugabe-led government fell out with mainly the British and the Americans, following a disputed presidential election in 2002, seen as unfair at the start of the fast-track land reform process (Scoones et al., 2011) . "We have turned East where the sun rises, and given our backs to the West where the sun Zimbabwe stood at $100 million. Even though these projects have had different levels of success, clearly China had brought significant investments into Zimbabwe at a time when it was facing significant economic sanctions.
Those critical of China have raised concerns about asymmetrical benefits and unethical business practices in the emerging relations. The critics of the Look East policy argue that Chinese companies are given preferential treatment by the government, often at the expense of opportunities for other business players, resulting in Zimbabwe losing revenue in uncollected taxes. The Chinese businesses underpay locals and also hire managers from China even though locals are equally or more experienced. There are also cases where the Chinese are thought to be flouting Zimbabwean tax regulations, undermining the rebate application process. "These revelations have brought Chinese-Zimbabwean relations under the microscope with some citizens [. . .] describing the economic relations between the two countries as that of a 'rider and horse'" (Mkudu, 2015) . Linked to this is also a criticism of China's failure to protect the rights of ordinary Africans.
Despite building the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa at a cost of $150 million, China's public diplomacy on the continent is perceived by some Africans negatively.
For example, China's use of power and veto is thought to have seriously undermined the cause of democracy in Darfur and Zimbabwe:
African civic groups need to start mobilising people to confront the Chinese government by demonstrating [. . .] against its activities in Zimbabwe and Darfur.
The people of Africa must not allow China to claim that it will always maintain a policy of non interference and the respect for sovereignty of African countries, yet be more than ready not only to illegally export weapons to African dictatorships, but also use its veto powers in the Security Council to block any punishment intended for those who commit crimes against humanity in the continent. (Moyo L., 2009) The above radical view, in this case from a blogger, represents barriers to Chinese power, which exist among some Zimbabweans. It represents the gap between reality and perception of Chinese power as it interacts with civic groups and ordinary Zimbabweans.
To study the diverse perceptions of China in Harare, the chapter deploys the allegory of the "blind men and an elephant" as used by Nyamnjoh (2012) . The attraction of the allegory is in how it questions different ways of knowing, in this case China, based on first-hand experience as opposed to merely contending with secondary narratives about something. In Nyamnjoh's version of this folktale, which exists in many cultures, what is significant is that the blind men collaborate and are full of anticipation "as the merchant who offers to take them to an elephant leads the way. They each contemplate and imagine how they will touch the elephant. The merchant coordinates and controls the encounter like a scientist conducting a laboratory experiment" (p. 64). The merchant's role in shaping perceptions is significant for this study as both local and international media have sought to frame the discourse on China to Zimbabweans.
In the allegory, the first blind man touched the left foreleg of the elephant and exclaimed, "So the queer animal feels like that!" The merchant led the second to the rear of the elephant, upon which he touched the tail and exclaimed: "Ha! Truly a queer animal! Truly odd! I know now. I know." The third man touched the elephant's trunk, "which moves back and forth, turning and twisting," and thought, "That's it! I've learned." When the three blind men got together to share and discuss their findings, they describe the elephant differently, according to what they touched, as "swinging back and forth," as "without branches" and shaped like a "snake." After their seemingly weird descriptions, unsurprisingly there was no conclusion because they had not thoroughly examined the whole elephant.
The focus of this allegory, according to Nyamnjoh, is not on physical blindness or sight, but on the ways of seeing and knowing: "We must grant that intimate encounters with the elephant, however, deep and convincing, are always approached from particular angles and perspectives, and that such encounters are further compounded by the dimensions of being an elephant that are beyond appearances" (Nyamnjoh, 2012, p. 65 ). The allegory is also similar to Hall's (1997) encoding and decoding model that reveals different ways in which audiences actively interpret media content based on their political, socioeconomic, and cultural circumstances. Hall's model can be linked to the above because the allegory also stands for "another kind of blindness-that which comes from preconceptions, prejudices and assumptions about what constitutes reality, a blindness of which all humans are guilty" (Nyamnjoh, 2012, p. 65) .
In a way, the blind men tried to "frame" stories of their experiences with the elephant for the purpose of convincing each other. Frames "hold great power in setting the context for debate, defining issues under consideration, summoning a variety of mental representations, and providing the basic tools to discuss the issues at hand" (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 70) . The blind men questioned and challenged each other's frames because their readings were from particular angles and perspectives, and because such encounters were shaped by prior knowledge at guided their interpretations. As will be seen below, the perception of the Chinese by citizens of Harare is guided by their social position, their prior knowledge, prejudices, and lack of knowledge of Beijing. The findings discussed below clearly show the possibilities and limits of China's public diplomacy and soft power in one of its partner countries.
The research involved nonprobability sampling of ordinary citizens of Harare, from July to September 2014. For this process, a questionnaire, designed to address the core research objectives, was administered to Harare citizens on the basis of their accessibility and also by purposive judgment of the researcher. This method helped both the researcher and the participants save time, generated specific answers, and was generally more efficient in measuring the Sino-Zimbabwean relationship. The questionnaire was meant to maximize the relationship between the answers recorded and what the research wanted to measure, which in this case was how Chinese interventions were regarded by Zimbabweans who live in Harare.
Harare is the capital city and administrative hub of Zimbabwe. With 2.1 million people (16.2 percent of the national population), it is urban in character and is relatively more developed than all other provinces of the country. Unlike other cities in Zimbabwe, Harare has a significant industrial sector, a good road network, and other facilities such as schools, hospitals, tourism, and agriculture. The main development challenges faced by Harare include overpopulation; dilapidated roads and general infrastructure such as electricity, water, and sewer system; poor residential accommodation delivery; and social vices such as crime, gambling, and prostitution 
China's Media, Soft Power and Public Diplomacy
China's soft power or public diplomacy in Zimbabwe, as in other countries, must be considered as multisided and as evident in areas such as health, culture, Confucius Institutes, environment, interparty communication, mass media, cultural exchanges, tourism, and youth development programs. Li Anshan et al. (2012, p. 25) note that China has enhanced its "media influence in Africa to challenge false international media reports about China-Africa cooperation, and issue news reports reflecting China's perspectives." They add that China's main news agencies have upped their role and African media personnel have been visiting China to attend training programs. The extent to which such public diplomacy, media, and cultural programs shore up China's power is debatable (Gagliardone et al., 2012; Wasserman, 2013; Li and Ronning, 2013) .
Apart from language problems and low cultural proximity between China and Africa, there is lack of experience and understanding of Beijing's media and culture. The lack of China's influence is partly to do with "traditional dependence on 'western media' for foreign news and global affairs and lack of knowledge of Chinese or Chinese society" (Kupe, 2013, p. 146 Perceptions of China in Zimbabwe, and in Harare in particular, were investigated because of the country's strategic importance to China. Zimbabwe's "Look East" policy was also a major factor. Beijing is also a topic of regular critical discussion in the Zimbabwean parliament and across its media. As will be seen below, China is seen as both a panacea and a hindrance to Zimbabwe's development. For example, in a contribution to the press, Eddie Cross (2013) Using the allegory of the blind men and the elephant, one can argue that the above view represents an understanding of the "elephant," that is China, from an alternative political perspective. As will be discussed below, Cross's perception is not isolated as it coincides with the views held by some Zimbabweans I interviewed. It is a critique based on local politics where an opposition leader is seeking to implicate the ruling party in failed management of the country. 
Findings
The analysis of the findings is presented below in terms of themes based on questions asked and how they were responded to:
Responses to Whether Zimbabwe-China Relations are Mutually
Beneficial
Of the 100 respondents analyzed, 98 (98 percent) did not consider the Zimbabwe-China relations as mutually beneficial. The majority were of the view that China was using Zimbabwe to service its own markets: exploit the natural resources of Zimbabwe and only sustain the booming Chinese economy. A tiny percentage, 2 percent of the respondents, was of the view that the relationship between Zimbabwe and China was "mutually beneficial." For them, the Chinese were playing a part in "reviving the Zimbabwean economy" and were providing locals with the much-needed economic resources, including "jobs and cheaper" commodities. The majority of Harare residents clearly did not consider Chinese interventions as beneficial.
Perception of Zimbabwe-China Economic Relations
The economic theme generated many anti-China views. As per the findings of the survey in Responses clearly indicated that Harare residents see the Chinese as being more concerned about exploiting Zimbabwe's natural resources, making "use of the abundant cheap labor" in the country and "depositing shoddy commodities" into the Zimbabwean market. As opposed to helping the Zimbabwean economy recover, most respondents felt that the Chinese are only interested in "quick profits" and in leveraging their own economic interests. Even those who were of the view that Zimbabwe is economically benefiting from its relations with China were also convinced that the benefits were more for China. For example, some of the respondents who said Zimbabwe was economically benefiting from China also alluded to "economically harmful practices" by the Chinese, such as not banking money in Zimbabwe, "underpaying employees," "shady deals with government," and "lack of investment in infrastructure and social services." Some of those who said Zimbabwe is benefiting were of the view that the benefit is largely in the retailing sector. This view tends to coincide with that of those who think that the Chinese are not contributing to economic growth as they are more interested in having Zimbabwe as a market for their own industries in China. In terms of the allegory of the blind men and the elephant, the above views illustrate different readings based on information from media and experience in dealing with China. 
Attitudes to the Teaching of Mandarin in Zimbabwe
The survey also sought views on the teaching of the official Chinese language, Mandarin, at some educational institutions in Zimbabwe. There was a specific question relating to this and the The Harare respondents' reluctance to approve the teaching of Chinese was also born out of their earlier mistrust, emanating from negative perceptions on how China conducted its business with Zimbabwe. While most of the respondents believed that China is mainly interested in exploiting Zimbabwe economically, they also felt that the teaching of Chinese language is an avenue for strengthening this exploitative relationship.
Views on How Zimbabweans Could Benefit More from ZimbabweChina Relations
The Harare respondents felt that Zimbabwe-China relations could be improved if the Chinese genuinely focused their attention on investing in the revival and growth of Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector. Respondents noted that the problem with the current situation was that the Chinese were simply exploiting Zimbabweans through "dumping cheap goods from China," "illtreating Zimbabwean employees," and "cheaply extracting Zimbabwean raw materials." It was also strongly felt that relations could be improved and become more beneficial if economic deals between the Zimbabweans and the Chinese were conducted in a more "transparent and inclusive manner." This was expressed against the background in which most of the business deals between the Zimbabwean government and the Chinese were being concluded in a manner that "violated" Zimbabwe's tender procedures. Some respondents also felt that relations could be improved if the Zimbabwean government consults with a cross-section of Zimbabwean citizens before concluding business deals with the Chinese. From the responses given, it also appears that Zimbabweans would want to see better-quality goods being imported from China into Zimbabwe. This is in consideration of how most respondents lamented that Chinese goods coming into Zimbabwe are substandard.
Perceptions of Zimbabwean Media Coverage of China-Zimbabwe Relations
Harare residents have better access to media than all the other citizens in the country and were therefore suitably qualified to judge the character, tone, and quality of coverage of SinoZimbabwean relations in the local media. Their most prevalent view was that the privately owned media in Zimbabwe such as The Standard, Zimbabwe Independent, Daily News, and NewsDay were more accurate in their reportage on issues to do with Zimbabwe-China relations than was the case with state-controlled media such as The Herald. Based on the media mentioned, the findings of the survey showed how respondents ranked the accuracy of the national media in their reportage on Zimbabwe-China issues as presented in Figure 12 .4.
<COMP: INSERT FIGURE 12.4 HERE>
The rankings for accuracy were on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being the most accurate and 10 being the least accurate. The respondents also added explanations. While some of the Harare respondents did not indicate reasons for their rankings, there was a general observation that statecontrolled media were biased in their reportage of Zimbabwe-China relations as they tended to uncritically "state the government position" on these relations, without analyzing the real situation on the ground. However, there were a few respondents who indicated that "both privately controlled and government controlled media were biased" in their reportage on issues pertaining to Zimbabwe-China relations. A few of the respondents alluded to "the problem of media polarization on political grounds." There were also possible contradictions in the answers to the question. For instance, some respondents said The Herald and the state broadcaster ZBC were the most accurate in reporting on Zimbabwe-China relations while at the same time claiming that Zimbabwe was not benefiting from its relations with China. The overwhelming observation was that Zimbabwe was not benefiting from its relations with China and the view coincided with information from alternative media sources. Finally, a number of respondents chose not to respond to the question on media rankings, pointing out that "they did not follow the media." This supports the fact that media reports (or at least reports of the sampled media) are not necessarily the basis upon which Zimbabweans base their views on the country's relations with China. The media served as the merchant in the "blind men and the elephant" tale, discussed at the beginning of the chapter, in terms of producing perceptions of China. However, the perceptions did not entirely rely on the media.
The Extent to Which Zimbabwe Benefits from Media and Cultural Exchange Programs with China
The greater number of Harare respondents surveyed felt that Zimbabwe was not benefiting from media and cultural exchange programs with China. They felt that the mainstream media in China did not have "much interest in Zimbabwe's cultural well-being." They felt that it is Zimbabwe that seems to be putting more effort in this regard, with not much being done by China. The emerging cultural relations were asymmetrical. From the responses given, it would seem that most respondents viewed media and cultural exchange programs from the perspective of economic exploitation, in which China is more interested in championing its economic interests rather than in improving cultural relations with Zimbabwe.
Attitudes to Visiting China
The research on the Harare residents' emerging perceptions of China-Zimbabwe relations also sought to measure the respondents' interest in visiting China. Regardless of the negativity of the relations, 83 percent of respondents indicated that they are interested in visiting China, with the most popular responses being for "business purposes," "tourism," and "getting an appreciation of the Chinese culture." The other 17 percent indicated that they preferred to visit other European countries and not China, with the reasons varying from person to person. The behavior showed that the respondents were able to separate the problems with bilateral relations from their own personal ambition. It is also a window for China to invite more Zimbabweans so that they can have a first-hand experience. Table 12 .2 shows that the Chinese interventions are not viewed positively. There is a lack of familiarity with the "elephant" and great suspicion of its behavior. The official narrative of a "win-win" friendship was strongly rejected by the Harare respondents who participated in the survey.
Summary of Responses to Key Questions

Conclusions
The emerging perceptions of China-Zimbabwe relations as shown by this survey, although involving a small sample, are indicative of lack of knowledge of and trust in the Sino-Zimbabwe relations. Although it is still early to conclude, as shown by the attitudes of Harare residents, Chinese media and cultural soft power in Zimbabwe have not produced the desired positive admiration for China. The Harare residents, to some extent, are reflective of a broader national sentiment, overwhelmingly viewing the relations between the two countries as non beneficial, which could be linked to failure or lack of progress in Harare-specific projects that affect the residents. Within the boundaries of this wide-ranging perception, some respondents described the Chinese as "parasitic" and others called China the "new colonial master," and such views were probably influenced by the media. It is the perspective on China's economic exploitation of Zimbabwe that has resulted in the general distrust of the Chinese to the extent that some of the respondents are cynical of everything to do with China, including cultural exchanges and learning of the Chinese language. However, the respondents who held a pro-China perspective pointed out that China is helping "revive" the Zimbabwean economy in the wake of the economic embargo imposed on the country by the West.
The reluctance to have Mandarin taught in Zimbabwe points to resistance, among those interviewed, to assimilate or integrate the Chinese in local society. There is a clear ambivalence and even reluctance to have cultural exchanges with the Chinese. As observed from the pattern of responses, this sort of perspective is, to a larger extent, shaped by the view that China's motive is to exploit Zimbabwe's resources and not to help develop the country's economy.
With respect to perceptions of media coverage of issues dealing with Zimbabwe-China relations, there was a widespread view that, when compared with the government-controlled press, Zimbabwe's privately controlled press is more accurate in its reportage on these relations.
As can be observed, this widespread view is, however, caught up in the trap of media polarization on partisan political grounds. Only a few respondents pointed to this reality, in which both privately and state-controlled media are polarized in their reportage on issues dealing with Zimbabwe-China relations. This chapter concludes by asking whether China's soft power including its increasing infrastructural and technical support to the Zimbabwean media sector, mostly owned by the state, is having an impact on the power balance and in how it is received in transitional Zimbabwe. It is particularly crucial to determine the extent to which the above emerging perspectives on China manifest themselves among government officials, business people, journalists, workers unions, civil society leaders, and, especially, those who have been to China. It is also worth considering whether China's state-centered, one-actor model has helped advance its soft power in Zimbabwe.
The ability of China to respect Zimbabwean interests and to create mutually beneficial links will help shape how China's interventions will be tolerated by Zimbabweans. In his allegory, Nyamnjoh (2012, p. 65) asks whether it is possible to achieve "the level of objectivity needed to see the elephant for what it truly is-a complex reality that cannot be reduced to its constituent parts." He also asks "whether it matters what the elephant has to say" (p. 65). There is a sense that China has been the elephant which Zimbabweans and other Africans will need to approach without prejudices and preconceptions. The ultimate point is that although Beijing is powerful, its power over its image is limited by other points of power. China is increasingly influencing the global discourse on development, but it is not shaping it as it wishes because of local challenges to its image and power. 
